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Abstract Advances in neuroscience have implica-
tions for criminal law as well as civil and regulatory
law, including health, disability, and benefit law. The
role of the behavioral and brain sciences in health
insurance claims, the mental health parity debate, and
disability proceedings is examined.
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The burgeoning neurolaw literature focuses heavily
on the impact of advances in neuroscience for
criminal law,1 criminal procedure,2 and evidence
law,3 as well as tort law,4 property law,5 intellectual
property,6 confidentiality and privacy,7 protection of
human subjects,8 and the regulation of neuroscience-
based technologies.9 Little attention has been paid,
however, to the implications of neuroscience for more
traditional civil and regulatory health law issues.
In this essay, I explore the ways in which
neuroscience impacts a range of American health,
disability, and benefit law issues, including the scope
of public and private health insurance benefits, the
mental health parity debate, and the distribution of
benefits under social security and other programs. I
find that patients, patient advocacy organizations,
litigants, lobbyists, legislators, and scholars are
relying on advances in neuroscience to characterize
differences in brain structure and function as health
conditions worthy of insurance coverage, protected
civil status, and disability and other benefits. Al-
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1 See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Law, Responsibility, and the
Brain, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuro-
imaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.
U. L. Rev. 1265 (2007); O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging,
Entrapment, and the Predisposition to Crime, 7(9) AM. J.
BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 60 (2007); Jay D. Aronson, Brain
Imaging, Culpability and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 13
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 115 (2007); Melissa S. Caulum,
Postadolescent Brain Development: A Disconnect between
Neuroscience, Emerging Adults, and the Corrections System,
2007 WIS. L. EV. 729 (2007); Abram S. Barth, A Double-Edged
Sword: The Role of Neuroimaging in Federal Capital Sentenc-
ing, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 501 (2007); Debra Niehoff, Invisible
Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child Abuse, 56
DEPAUL L. EV. 847 (2007); Owen D. Jones, Law, Evolution, and
the Brain: Applications and Open Questions, in LAW & THE
BRAIN 57 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006);
Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience
Changes Nothing and Everything, in LAW & THE BRAIN (Semir
Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Owen D. Jones &
Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105(2)
COLUMBIA L. EV. 405 (2005); Stephen J. Morse, Brain
Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnos-
tic Note, 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Stephen J.
Morse, Moral and Legal Responsibility and the New Neurosci-
ence, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 33 (Judy Illes ed. 2006); Oliver R.
Goodenough, Responsibility and Punishment: Whose Mind? A
Response, in LAW & THE BRAIN 259 (Semir Zeki & Oliver
Goodenough eds., 2006); Eileen P. Ryan & Sarah B. Berson,
Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 25 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB.
though stakeholders by and large are not making
completely unfounded or speculative claims about
neuroscience, what does give me cause for pause is
the appropriateness of the subsequent normative
argument; that is, that all brain differences should be
treated as covered or protected conditions for pur-
poses of health, disability, and benefit law. I conclude
that advances in neuroscience give us reason to revisit
age-old health, disability, and benefit law questions
(such as, “What kinds of mental suffering create
legitimate claims from others through public or
private health insurance?”),10 but that neuroscience
does not yet answer these questions. Because I
anticipate that neuroscience will continue to play a
role in the development and shaping of health,
L. EV. 351 (2006); Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and
the Criminal Justice System, in LAW & THE BRAIN 227 (Semir
Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Richard E. Redding,
The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal
Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. EV. 51
(2006); James H. Fallon, Neuroanatomical Background to
Understanding the Brain of the Young Psychopath, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2006); Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A.
Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology and the Law: A Role in Juvenile
Justice? 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321 (2006); Katherine H.
Federle, Introduction to the Mind of a Child: The Relationship
between Brain Development, Cognitive Functioning, and
Accountability under the Law 3(2) OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 317
(2006); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe
Dysfunction in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAPITAL DEFENSE J.
395 (2004); Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of Develop-
mental Cognitive Research on “Evolving Standards of Decen-
cy” and the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM.
U. L. EV. 441 (2004); Laura Reider, Toward a New Test for the
Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience
into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. EV. 289 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of
Interrogation Jurisprudence?, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 341 (2007);
Sarah E. Stoller & Paul Root Wolpe, Emerging Neurotechnol-
ogies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J. L.
& MED. 359 (2007); Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence,
Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301
(2006); Erich Taylor, A New Wave of Police Interrogation?
“Brain Fingerprinting,” The Constitutional Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, and Hearsay Jurisprudence, 2006 U. ILL.
J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 287 (2006); Sean Kevin Thompson, The
Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in Intelligence
Interrogation, 90(6) CORNELL L. EV. 1601 (2005); Richard G.
Boire, Searching the Brain: The Fourth Amendment Implica-
tions of Brain-Based Deception Devices, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS
62 (2005).
3 See, e.g., Mark Pettit, FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain
Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. L. &
MED. 319 (2007); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie
Detection: The Cultural Bias against “Mind Reading” Devices,
72 BROOKLYN L. EV. 1351 (2007); Erin A. Egan, Neuroimaging
as Evidence, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 62 (2007);
Jocelyn Downie & Ronalda Murphy, Inadmissible, Eh? 7(9)
AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 67 (2007); Charles N.W.
Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
509 (2006); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading for the
Gatekeeper? 7 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2006).
4 See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, Emotional Harm, and
Emotional Distress Tort Claims, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-
NEUROSCIENCE 65 (2007); Adrian M. Viens, The Use of
Functional Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment of Loss
and Damages in Tort Law, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE
63 (2007); Adam Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of
Subjective Experience, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 433 (2007).
5 See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property ‘Instinct,’ in LAW
& THE BRAIN 185 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds.,
2006).
6 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy,
and Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications of
Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 114 (Brent Garland
ed., 2004).
7 See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging
Information: A Case for Neuro Exceptionalism? 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. EV. 415 (2007); Henry T. Greely, The Social Effects of
Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal Perspec-
tives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 245 (Judy Illes ed., 2006); Stacey A.
Tovino, The Visible Brain: Confidentiality and Privacy Impli-
cations of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Texas Medical Branch (2006);
Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy Implications
of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33(4) J. L. MED.
& ETHICS 844 (2005); Committee on Science and Law, Are
Your Thoughts Your Own? “Neuroprivacy” and the Legal
Implications of Brain Imaging, 60 CBA ECORD 407 (2005);
Greely, supra note 6, at 114.
8 See, e.g., Jennifer Kulynych, Some Thoughts about the
Evaluation of Non-Clinical Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 57 (2007);
Jennifer Kulynych, The Regulation of MR Neuroimaging
Research: Disentangling the Gordian Knot, 33 AM. J. L. &
MED. 295 (2007); Jennifer Kulynych, Legal and Ethical Issues
in Neuroimaging Research: Human Subjects Protection, Med-
ical Privacy, and the Public Communication of Research
Results, 50(3) BRAIN & COGNITION 345 (2002).
9 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based
Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L.
AND MED. 377 (2007); Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval
Regulation for Lie Detection: An Idea Whose Time May Be
Coming, 5(2) AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2005).
10 James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining “Medical
Necessity” in Mental Health Practice, 24(6) HASTINGS CENTER
EP. 5, 5 (1994).
102 S.A. Tovino
disability, and benefit law and policy, I recommend
that lawyers and scholars who work in these areas
(and not just those who self-identify as neurolawyers
and neuroethicists) be mindful of the ways in which
stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the
formulation and interpretation of such law.11
Three prefatory notes are in order. First, I will be
focusing on the impact of neuroscience for issues in
American health law and policy, with which I am
familiar. I hope to examine the impact of neuroscience
on other countries’ health, disability, and benefit
structures in the future. Second, the field of health
law is extraordinarily broad and rapidly changing.12
Here, I select just a few examples that I think are
illustrative, although not exhaustive, of the ways in
which stakeholders currently are using neuroscience to
impact health law and policy. I hope that readers with
background in health law and policy will identify
additional, relevant settings in which neuroscience-
based arguments may be raised and will question
whether such arguments should work in these settings.
Third, I use the phrase “mental disorders” to refer
to clinically significant behavioral or psychological
syndromes or patterns that occur in individuals and
that are associated with present distress or disability
or with a significantly increased risk of suffering
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of
freedom. Unfortunately, my and other definitions do
not adequately specify precise boundaries for the
concept of mental disorder. In addition, they imply a
distinction between the “mental” and “physical” that
may not exist. I present this definition here simply
because it is as useful as any other and may help
guide distinctions between normality and pathology.
Mental Disorder Statistics
This essay involves the use of neuroscience in civil
and administrative proceedings involving Americans
with mental disorders. Mental disorders are common
in the U.S. and abroad.13 According to the National
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), an estimated or
57.5 million American adults suffer from a diagnos-
able mental disorder in a given year.14 Approximately
one in seventeen American adults suffer from a
serious mental illness.15 And, an estimated 45% of
American adults who have one diagnosable mental
disorder meet criteria for at least one more diagnos-
able mental disorder.16
Historically, individuals with mental disorders
were treated with contempt, fear, and cruelty, perhaps
due to the belief that mental disorders stemmed from
parental misdeeds, demonic possession, or deficient
character.17 Mental disorders remain poorly under-
stood today.18 The National Mental Health Associa-
tion, recently renamed Mental Health America
(MHA), estimates that 71% of Americans still believe
that mental disorders are caused by mental weakness,
65% believe that mental disorders are the product of
poor parenting, and 35% believe that mental disorders
are a form of retribution for sinful or immoral
behavior.19 Many stakeholders believe that the stigma
against mental disorders plays a role in their lack of
funding for research, their lack of parity in public and




13 National Institute of Mental Health, Statistics, available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/index.shtml (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2008).
17 See, e.g., Keith Nelson, Legislative and Judicial Solutions
for Mental Health Parity: S. 543, Reasonable Accommodation,
and an Individualized Remedy under Title I of the ADA, 51 AM.
U. L. EV. 91, 98 (2001); Brian K. LaFratta, The Mental Health
Parity Act: A Bar to Insurance Benefits for the Elderly?
8 ELDER L.J. 393, 406 (2000).
12 Health law has been described as both an exciting and
interdisciplinary field as well as an incoherent discipline. See,
e.g., Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health
Law, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L. EV. 391 (2006); Einer R. Elhauge,
Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law? 41(2)
WAKE FOREST L. EV. 365 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The History
and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41(2)
WAKE FOREST L. EV. 347 (2006); Mark A. Hall et al.,
Rethinking Health Law, 41(2) WAKE FOREST L. EV. 341 (2006).
11 See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 7, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991) (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways
in which the clinical literature might bear on the formulation of
legal arrangements).
19 Id.
18 See, e.g., Jeffery Fraser, Allegheny County Mental Health
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available and reimbursable treatments.20 Four sets of
mental disorders, including schizophrenia, bipolar
disorder, drug and alcohol dependence, and anorexia
nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are frequently used to
illustrate these claims. Scientists have conducted
hundreds of structural and functional neuroimaging
studies investigating these conditions.21 A careful
review of these studies reveals many findings as well as
many discrepancies and contradictions.22 Some of these
studies do find that the brains of individuals affected by
21 See, e.g., Karen Faith Berman, Functional Neuroimaging in
Schizophrenia, in NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH
GENERATION OF PROGRESS 745, 748 (Kenneth L. Davis et al.
eds., 2002); Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar
Blood Volume in Schizophrenia and Bipolar disorder, 37
SCHIZOPHRENIA ESEARCH 81, 81 (1999); Robert B. Zipursky et
al., Widespread Cerebral Gray Matter Volume Deficits in
Schizophrenia, 49(3) Archives General Psychiatry 195 (1992);
Raquel E. Gur et al., Deconstructing Psychosis with Human
Brain Imaging, 33(4) SCHIZOPHRENIA BULLETIN 921, 922
(2007); Birgit Abler et al., Abnormal Reward System Activation
in Mania, NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1, 9–10 (2007); Jakub
Z. Zonarski et al., Volumetric Neuroimaging Investigations in
Mood Disorders: Bipolar Disorder Versus Major Depressive
Disorder, 10 BIPOLAR DISORDERS 1 (2008); Jane Avery Serene
et al., Neuroimaging Studies of Children with Serious Emo-
tional Disturbances: A Selective Review, 52(3) CANADIAN J.
PSYCHIATRY (2007); Yoshihide Akine et al., Altered Brain
Activation by a False Recognition Task in Young Abstinent
Patients with Alcohol Dependence, 31(9) ALCOHOLISM: CLINI-
CAL & EXPERIMENTAL ESEARCH 1589 (2007); Joanna S. Fowler
20 See, e.g, Pamela Signorello, The Failure of the ADA-
Achieving Parity with Respect to Mental and Physical Health
Care Coverage in the Private Employment Realm, 10 CORNELL
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 368 (2001) (“Some diseases are more
politically ‘in’ than others. We all know the more political
backing there is, the more attention, the more funds, and the
more patient-protection legislation. My guess is that if AIDS
rates a 10, then breast cancer is a 7, prostate cancer is a 6 …
Yes, you guessed it. I am unable to assign a number to the
mental health category. If I have to judge by the coverage in the
popular press, the category is close the bottom of the food
chain.”); id. at 371 (“Contrary to lingering public perception,
mental illnesses are not indicative of personal weakness, lack of
character, or poor upbringing. One thing is certain. The stigma
associated with mental illness has supported the disparity in
health care coverage.”); Nicole Martinson, Inequality between
Disabilities: The Different Treatment of Mental Versus Physical
Disabilities in Long-Term Disability Benefit Plans, 50 BAYLOR
L. EV. 361, 361 (1998) (“The stigma of mental illness has kept
many in need from seeking help, and it has prevented
policymakers from providing it.”); Brian D. Shannon, Paving
the Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coverage for Mental
Illness: New Law or Merely Good Intentions?, 68 U. COLO. L.
EV. 63, 85 (1997) (citing 142 Cong. Rec. S3590 (daily ed.
Apr.18, 1996) (statement of Senator Wellstone)) (“The stigma
of mental illness has kept many in need from seeking help, and
it has prevented policymakers from providing it. And for too
long, persons in need of mental health services who reach
private coverage discriminatory limits have been dumped into
Government-funded programs.”).
et al., Imaging the Addicted Brain, Imaging the Addicted
Human Brain, SCIENCE & PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 4 (2007);
Andreas J. Bartsch et al., Manifestations of Early Brain
Recovery Associated with Abstinence from Alcoholism, 130
BRAIN 36 (2007); Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Role of the Anterior
Cingulate and Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex in Processing Drug
Cues in Cocaine Addiction, 144(4) NEUROSCIENCE 1153 (2007);
Sandra Chanraud et al., Brain Morphometry and Cognitive
Performance in Detoxified Alcohol-Dependents with Preserved
Psychosocial Functioning, 32 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
429 (2007); Dardo Tomasi et al., Thalamo-Cortical Dysfunction
in Cocaine Abusers: Implications in Attention and Perception,
155 PSYCHIATRY ESEARCH: NEUROIMAGING 189 (2007); G. Dom
et al., Substance Use Disorders and the Orbitofrontal Cortex,
187 BRITISH J. PSYCHIATRY 209 (2005); Peter S. Kufahl et al.,
Neural Responses to Acute Cocaine Administration in the
Human Brain Detected by fMRI, 28 NEUROIMAGE 904 (2005);
Nikos Makris et al., Decreased Absolute Amygdala Volume in
Cocaine Addicts, 44 NEURON 729 (2004); D.J. Meyerhoff et al.,
Effects of Heavy Drinking, Binge Drinking, and Family History
of Alcoholism on Regional Brain Metabolites, 28(4) ALCOHOL-
ISM: CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL ESEARCH 650 (2004); Clinton D.
Kilts et al., The Neural Correlates of Cue-Induced Craving in
Cocaine-Dependent Women, 161(2) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 233
(2004); Andreas Heinz et al., Correlation between Dopamine D
Sub 2 Receptors in the Ventral Striatum and Central Processing
of Alcohol Cues and Craving, 161(10) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1783
(2004); Nora D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human Brain
Viewed in the Light of Imaging Studies: Brain Circuits and
Treatment Strategies, 47 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 3 (2004); Nora
D. Volkow et al., The Addicted Human Brain: Insights from
Imaging Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444
(2003); A.R. Lingford-Hughes et al., Addiction, 65 BRITISH
MED. BULLETIN 209 (2003); Ingrid Agartz et al., MR Volumetry
during Acute Alcohol Withdrawal and Abstinence: A Descrip-
tive Study, 38(1) ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 71 (2003); Nora D.
Volkow et al., The Addicted Human Brain: Insights from
Imaging Studies, 111(10) J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1444
(2002); Rita Z. Goldstein et al., Drug Addiction and Its
Underlying Neurobiological Basis: Neuroimaging Evidence
for the Involvement of the Frontal Cortex, 159(10) AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1642 (2002); Stephen J. Uftring et al., An fMRI
Study of the Effect of Amphetamine on Brain Activity, 25(6)
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 925 (2001); Bruce E. Wexler et
al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Cocaine
Craving, 158(1) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 86 (2001); R.S.N. Liu et
al., Association between Brain Size and Abstinence from
Alcohol, 355 (9219) LANCET 1969 (2000); Daniel W. Homer,
Functional Imaging of Craving, ALCOHOL ESEARCH & HEALTH
(Fall 2999); Mark Mühlau et al., Gray Matter Decrease of the
Anterior Cingulate Cortex in Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1850 (2007); E.K. Lambe et al., Cerebral Gray
Matter Volume Deficits after Weight Recovery from Anorexia
Nervosa, 54(6) ARCHIV. GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 537 (1997);
Angela Wagner et al., Altered Reward Processing in Women
Recovered from Anorexia Nervosa, 164(12) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
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these conditions are anatomically, cognitively, and/or
chemically “different” when compared to the brains of
healthy controls.23 In the past twenty years, stakeholders
have referenced these findings in an attempt to influence
health law and policy, especially the scope of private
and public health insurance benefits.
The Scope of Health Insurance Benefits
Most Americans with private health insurance receive
coverage through their employers as a benefit of
employment.24 When employers first began offering
health insurance benefits,25 covered employees general-
ly had access to physical and mental health benefits
under the same terms and conditions.26 Beginning in the
1970s, many employers reduced their mental health
benefits, which were thought to be more expensive than
physical health benefits.27 The Jackson Hole Group, an
influential body of health care executives and policy
analysts, even recommended that employers limit their
mental health benefits to twenty outpatient visits and
thirty inpatient days each year.28 Some employers also
increased deductibles and lowered lifetime and daily
limits applicable to mental health care.29
These benefit package changes resulted in a
disparity between the private insurance coverage that
was provided for employees’ physical illnesses and
mental disorders.30 Health insurance plans that cov-
ered 365 days of inpatient care for physical illnesses
might cover only 45 days of inpatient care for mental
disorders.31 Plans that provided unlimited outpatient
visits for treatment of physical illnesses might allow
only 20 outpatient visits for treatment of mental
disorders.32 And plans that contained a $1 million
lifetime cap for treatment of physical illnesses might
contain only a $50,000 lifetime cap for treatment of
mental disorders.33 These coverage disparities ad-
versely affected individuals with mental disorders.
Many individuals with disabling bipolar disorder and
severe anorexia nervosa were forced to discontinue their
inpatient and outpatient treatments when they had
reached their mental health benefit caps.34 The lack of
treatment exacerbated underlying illnesses and symp-
27 See, e.g., Allan Beigel & Steven S. Sharfstein, Mental
Health Care Providers: Not the Only Cause or Only Cure for
Rising Costs, 142(5) AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 668 (May 1984) (“In
1955 mental health expenditures were estimated to be $1.2
billion, or 6% of all expenditures. By 1977 the total amount of
expenditures for mental health care had risen to $19.6 billion,
12% of all expenditures. Even with a correction for population
growth and price increases, this amounts to a fourfold increase
in mental health expenditures.”); Kaplan, supra note 26, at 328
(mental health benefits are two to three times as expensive as
physical illness benefits).
28 See Robert Pear, White House Plan Would Cover Costs of
Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2003, at A1.
29 See, e.g., Beigel & Sharfstein, supra note 27, at 668 (“Costs
have risen, resulting in resistance to financing treatment of
mental illness in both public and private sectors.”); Kaplan,
supra note 26, at 328.
30 See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 26, at 328.
31 See Shannon, supra note 20, at 68.
32 See id.
33 See id.
23 See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner, Mind Over Matter? The
Historical Search for Meaningful Parity Between Mental and
Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 683
(2000) (quoting Fuller Torrey, one of America’s most famous
psychiatrists: “[T]he evidence is now overwhelming that the
brains of persons who have schizophrenia are, as a group,
different from brains of persons who do not have the disease.”);
Karen Faith Berman, Functional Neuroimaging in Schizophre-
nia, in NEUROSPYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: THE FIFTH GENERATION
OF PROGRESS 745, 747 (Kenneth L. Davis et al. eds., 2002);
Philip McGuire et al., Functional Neuroimaging in Schizophre-
nia: Diagnosis and Drug Discovery, TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOG-
ICAL SCIENCES 1, 6 (IN PRESS, 2008) (ON FILE WITH AUTHOR).
34 See, e.g., Beth A. Brunalli, Anorexia Killed Her, but the
System Failed Her: Does the American Insurance System Suffer
from Anorexia, 12 CONN. INS. L. J. 583, 591 (2005/2006).
24 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 93.
25 See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE ISE OF A SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND
THE MAKING OF AVAST INDUSTRY 294–95 (1949) (discussing early
examples of employer-based health insurance).
26 Dana L. Kaplan, Can Legislation Alone Solve America’s
Mental Health Dilemma? Current State Legislative Schemes
Cannot Achieve Mental Health Parity, 8 QUINNIPIAC L.J. 325,
328 (2005).
1842 (Dec. 2007); Ursula F. Bailer et al., Exaggerated 5-HT1A
but Normal 5-HT2A Receptor Activity in Individuals Ill with
Anorexia Nervosa, 61(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1090 (May 1,
2007); Ursula F. Bailer et al., Altered Brain Serotonin 5-HT1A
Receptor Finding after Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa
Measured by Positron Emission Tomography, 62(9) ARCHIVES
GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 1032 (2005); G.K. Frank et al., Reduced
5-HT2A Receptor Binding after Recovery from Anorexia
Nervosa, 52(9) BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 896 (Nov. 1, 2002);
Walter H. Kaye et al., Altered Serotonin 2A Receptor Activity in
Women Who Have Recovered from Bulimia Nervosa, 158(7)
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1152 (2001).
22 See, e.g., Russell T. Loeber et al., Differences in Cerebellar
Blood Volume in Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, 37
SCHIZOPHRENIA ESEARCH 81, 81 (1999).
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toms, sometimes leading to unemployment, homeless-
ness, incarceration, and premature death.35
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some patients
who were denied additional mental health benefits
sued their insurers, arguing that their conditions were
physical rather than mental in nature and thus covered
under the “better” set of benefits.36 In these contract-
based lawsuits, the plaintiffs’ experts routinely
referenced advances in the behavioral and brain
sciences to support their testimony. In a 1987 case
out of Arkansas, for example, an insured father sued
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) when it denied
additional benefits to his dependent daughter, who
had a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder.37 The
BCBS plan at issue provided liberal benefits for
hospitalization and medical treatment for physical
illnesses and accidental injuries, but only limited
benefits for “mental, psychiatric, and nervous con-
ditions,” which the plan did not define.38 At trial, the
father called three psychiatrists and two clinical
psychologists to testify that bipolar disorder is a
physical disease of the brain.39 The experts referenced
advances in “medical research” to support their
testimony that bipolar affective disorder is an illness
of the brain that stems from physical and biological
causes.40 The court ultimately agreed that the daugh-
ter’s illness was a physical condition within the
meaning of the BCBS plan,41 but the victory was
short-lived.42 Following the decision, BCBS re-wrote
its Arkansas policy and clarified that the coverage
limitation for psychiatric conditions applied whether
the condition was “’organic or non-organic, whether
of biological, non-biological, chemical or non-chem-
ical origin, and irrespective of cause, basis or
inducement.’”43
Some courts focus not on the origin of the
plaintiff’s condition but on the ways in which the
plaintiff’s condition manifests itself. In a 1989 case
out of California, a plaintiff who became totally
disabled as a result of his bipolar disorder sued his
insurance company for both long-term disability
benefits and medical benefits.44 The long-term dis-
ability plan expressly excluded coverage for “mental
and nervous disorders.”45 The medical plan stated that
it would pay only 50% of physician charges for
“mental and/or nervous treatment,” which the plan
defined as “treatment for a neurosis, psycho-neurosis,
psychopathy, psychosis, or mental or nervous disease
or disorder of any kind.”46 At trial, the plaintiff called
an expert witness who testified that the plaintiff’s disorder
was an organic disease caused by a chemical imbalance
and other physiological disease processes.47 The court,
taking judicial notice of the then-current edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), which listed bipolar disorder as a mental
disorder,48 disagreed, stating that the test was whether
the manifestation, not the origin, of the disorder was
mental or physical in nature.49 Because the plaintiff’s
disorder manifested itself in very high moods and very
low moods, the court classified his disorder as a mental
disorder.50
In 1990, the Eighth Circuit also focused on
symptoms, reasoning that most laypersons understand
38 Id. at 430.
39 Id. at 430–31.
40 Id. at 431 (“Dr. Thomas Harris, a treating psychiatrist...
stated it is in fact a physical disorder. ‘The medical research is
now, in my opinion, overwhelming in that regard.’ He stated
that it was an illness of the brain and body rather than of the
mind and stemmed from a chemical imbalance which responds
to medication. This illness, like many others he described,
manifest some behavioral or emotional disturbances, but the
causes of those manifestations are physical and biological in
nature as distinguished from mental.”).
41 Id. at 432.
42 Shannon, supra note 20, at 76.
35 See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of
Parity Legislation for the Seriously Mentally Ill, 29 AM J. L. &
MED. 185, 185 (2003); Nelson, supra note 17, at 99.
36 See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 34, at 598.
37 Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.
W.2d 429, 431 (1987).
43 Id.
44 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Berry, 212 Cal. App.3d
832, 834–35 (1989).
45 Id. at 835.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 839–40.
48 Id. at 840.
49 Id. (“Every reasonable layman would view a person
manifesting such derangement as suffering from a mental
disease. The policies here in question exclude all mental
disease from coverage… regardless of whether the disability
was caused by a chemical imbalance, a blow on the head, being
frightened by a black cat, inability to cope or whatever.... In the
disability policy, mental disorders are expressly “not covered.”
Period…. Manifestation, not cause, is the yardstick.”).
50 Id. at 839–40.
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illnesses in terms of their symptoms, not their origin.
In the Eighth Circuit case, an insured father sued
Lincoln National Life Insurance Company when it
denied additional benefits to his dependent son, who
had an affective mood disorder that manifested itself
in a sharp decline in grades, repeated incidents of
lying, mood swings, and aberrant behavior in and out
of school.51 One of the applicable insurance plans
limited coverage for hospital charges associated with
“mental illness(es), functional nervous disorder(s)…
or for psychiatric or psychoanalytic care.”52 A second
applicable plan limited coverage for the care of
“mental illness(es).”53 Neither plan defined mental
illness.54 At trial, the father called three physicians of
various specialties to testify that “mounting evidence
suggest[s] that affective mood disorder is genetically
or biologically caused.”55 Notwithstanding, the
Eighth Circuit found that the son’s affective mood
disorder was a mental illness subject to the more
limited coverage because symptoms, not origin,
mattered, and because most laypersons would agree
that the symptoms of affective mood disorder are
behavioral, rather than physical, in nature.56 Other
American courts have adhered to the same layperson
standard en route to ruling in favor of the insurer.57
Finally, in a pair of decisions issued in 2006 and
2007 the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia addressed several questions relating to
the insurance coverage of bipolar disorder. The issue
before the District Court in the 2006 decision was
whether bipolar disorder, if proved by the patient,
would be subject to the mental illness cap set forth in
the defendant’s disability insurance policy.58 The
plaintiff called a physician to testify that bipolar
disorder is a neurobiological disorder that affects the
physical and chemical structures of the brain.59 The
insurer, on the other hand, contended that bipolar
disorder is a mental illness subject to the lower benefit
caps because bipolar disorder is included within the
DSM-IV’s classification of mental disorders60 (even
though the DSM-IV acknowledges that no good
distinction between physical and mental disorders
exists61). In the end, the District Court construed the
57 See, e.g., Lynd v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 94 F.3d
979, 983–984 (5th Cir. 1996; “Laypersons are inclined to focus
on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose primary
symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior
are commonly characterized as mental illness regardless of their
cause.”); Tolson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 604, 610
(5th Cir. 1998; same; depression therefore is a mental illness);
Pelletier v. Fleet Fin. Group, 2000 WL 1513711 (D.N.H. 2000;
same; major depressive disorder therefore is a mental illness);
Attar v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 1997 WL 446439 (N.D. Tex.
1997; same; bipolar disorder therefore is a mental illness).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 153–154 (“The cause of a disease is a judgment for
experts, while laymen know and understand symptoms. Lay-
men undoubtedly are aware that some mental illnesses are
organically caused while others are not; however, they do not
classify illnesses based on their origins. Instead, laypersons are
inclined to focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose
primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual
behavior are commonly characterized as mental illnesses
regardless of their cause… [The son’s] disease manifested itself
in terms of mood swings and aberrant behavior. Regardless of
the cause of his disorder, it is abundantly clear that he suffered
from what laypersons would consider to be a ‘mental
illness.’”).
58 Fitts v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235,
*12 (2006) (“[The insured] alleges that the term ‘mental illness’
should be defined to exclude any ailment that has a physical or
biological basis. Pursuant to that definition, she maintains that
her sickness, bipolar disorder, is not a mental illness because it
has physical, biological, and genetic components.”).
59 Id. at *12–*13 (“[The witness] explains that it may be
characterized by certain physical occurrences, including degen-
erative changes observed in the brain, and a progressive loss of
hippocampal cells in the brain. In addition, he stated that
depressive episodes associated with bipolar disorder are
generally accompanied by large outpourings of corticosteroids
(stress hormones) from the adrenal gland, which are damaging
to a number of areas of the brain.... [He] ultimately concludes
that bipolar disorder is a physical illness because it is a disease
afflicting a physical organ of the body, just like diseases
affecting the heart, the kidneys, or the liver.”).
51 Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 921
F.2d 150, 152, 154 (1990).
52 Id. at 152.
53 Id.
54 Id.
60 Id. at *15.
61 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, Fourth Edition xxx
(4th ed., Text Rev., 2000; “Although this volume is titled the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the term
mental disorder unfortunately implies a distinction between
‘mental’ disorders and ‘physical’ disorders that is a reductionistic
anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling literature
documents that there is much ‘physical’ in ‘mental’ disorders
and much ‘mental’ in ‘physical’ disorders. The problem raised by
the term ‘mental’ disorders has beenmuch clearer than its solution,
and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of the DSM-IV
because we have not found an appropriate substitute….”).
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definition of mental illness against the insurer and
held that bipolar disorder was covered under the
better set of benefits.62
The issue before the District Court in the 2007
opinion was whether the plaintiff actually had bipolar
disorder.63 The insurer first contended that the
plaintiff did not have bipolar disorder beacuse no
brain scans showed any changes in the plaintiff’s
brain; then, the insurer conceded that brain scans
cannot yet diagnose bipolar disorder.64 Lawyers
frequently make strong arguments followed by con-
cessions and engage in alternative argumentation. This
kind of zealous advocacy may confuse the court because
it first validates and then invalidates the underlying
neuroimaging technology. In the end, the District Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiff.65
Since the time of these cases Congress and many
State legislatures have passed laws that require some
health insurance plans to provide some parity in their
coverage of physical and mental health conditions.
For those health insurance plans that are not regulated
by a federal or state parity law, including public
programs such as the Medicare and Medicaid Pro-
grams,66 and for regulated insurance plans based in
states with incomplete parity laws, the outcome of a
plaintiff’s case against the insurer for the better set of
benefits will depend on whether and how the plan
defines mental disorder and how the court interprets
either the definition or the undefined phrase.
One question is whether and how advances in
neuroscience, including structural and functional
neuroimaging, will impact the scope of insurance
coverage disputes. Based on litigants’ liberal use of
psychiatric, psychological, and neuroimaging evi-
dence to support brain-based claims starting in the
late 1980s, as well as stakeholders’ use of neuro-
imaging evidence in mental health parity debates and
disability claim proceedings, as discussed in more
detail below, I would anticipate plaintiffs’ continued
use of the behavioral and brain sciences to argue that
certain mental disorders are biological in nature and,
therefore, deserving of benefits applicable to physical
illnesses. Given decisions in cases such as Arkansas
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe,67 which
found that bipolar disorder was an illness of the brain
that stemmed from physical and biological causes,68 I
also anticipate that plaintiffs’ neuroscience-based
claims may have some success in jurisdictions that
look to the cause or origin of the plaintiff’s disorder,
especially if the disorder is one of the better known
DSM-IV axis 1 clinical disorders (such as schizo-
phrenia or bipolar disorder), or axis 3 general medical
conditions that plays a role in the development,
continuance, or exacerbation of an axis 1 or 2 disorder
(such as a brain injury or AIDS that can result in
symptoms of mental illness).
In cases involving other mental disorders, I suspect
that the outcome will depend on whether that
jurisdiction focuses on origin, treatment, manifesta-
tion, or symptoms,69 as well as whether the “first
impression” symptoms are physical (e.g., starvation
and dehydration symptoms of an eating disorder) or
behavioral (e.g., delusions and hallucinations associ-
ated with schizophrenia) and, if behavioral, the ability
of the plaintiff’s experts to convince the jury that such
behavior is brain-based. Given the ready (Internet)
availability of neuroimaging studies finding that
emotion may be correlated with blood oxygenation
level dependent (BOLD) activity in the limbic
66 See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 34, at 622 (discussing the non-
application of many state parity laws to public health insurance
programs); TREATMENT ADVOCACY CENTER, MEDICAID DISCRIM-
INATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESSES,
available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact12.
htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (“While the federal government
seeks ‘parity’ for treatment of lesser forms of mental illness by
private insurers, it continues to discriminate against those with
severe mental illnesses by denying them coverage under Medicaid
when they require hospitalization in a psychiatric hospital.”).
62 Fitts, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *24-*25.
63 Fitts v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397,
*2 (2007).
64 Id. at *25.
65 Id. (“Although bipolar disorder is an organic disorder
associated with physiological changes in the brain, there is no
test that reveals or confirms the diagnosis of bipolar disorder,
and [the plaintiff] cannot be required to produce what does not
exist in order to prevail.”).
67 Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Doe, 733 S.
W.2d 429 (1987).
68 Id. at 431.
69 See, e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d
302, 310–11 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that different jurisdictions
use competing definitions of mental illness); Fitts, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9235, at *21 (noting that the courts have relied on
at least five different approaches for defining mental illness).
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system,70 attention may be correlated with BOLD
activity in the right caudate nucleus and gobus
pallidus,71 motor activity may be correlated with
BOLD activity in the primary motor cortex,72
perception may be correlated with changes in the
sensory association cortex,73 working memory may
be correlated with BOLD activity in the prefrontal
cortex,74 and so on,75 I do anticipate that aggressive
plaintiffs may try to argue the brain-basis of the many
signs and symptoms of mental illness, including those
relating to emotion (e.g., depression, mania, anxiety
and flat affect), consciousness (e.g., decreased atten-
tion span, disorientation, and delirium), motor behav-
ior (e.g., underactivity, overactivity, and compulsive
movements), perception (e.g., auditory and visual hallu-
cinations and other distortions of real events), long- and
short-term memory impairments, speech, insight, and
thinking (including thoughts of persecution or Apocry-
phal doom).76 I also anticipate that defendant insurers
may respond by arguing either that mental disorders
cannot yet be diagnosed by a brain scan or that the
plaintiff failed to introduce a brain scan that would have
provided objective evidence of a mental disorder.77
How should we assess these neuroscience-based
claims? Scholars already have laid the groundwork
for evaluating claims made about fMRI-lie detectors
in terms of meeting relevance and reliability require-
ments set forth in civil and criminal rules of
evidence.78 In scope-of-insurance lawsuits involving
functional neuroimaging evidence, litigants very well
may have similar evidentiary defenses based on many
of the same relevancy and reliability problems. These
include underlying problems with the theory of
neurovascular coupling, the time lag associated with
blood flow, the localization of neuronal activity, the
statistical averaging of images, paired image subtrac-
tion, subject selection, the number of subjects and
implications for statistical significance, as well as
broader philosophical concerns relating to the inher-
ent sociocultural and historical subjectivity of diag-
nosing and classifying psychiatric conditions.79 A
review of structural and functional neuroimaging
studies involving individuals with mental disorders
reveals several additional limitations, including the
effect that different psychotropic drug regimens,
alcohol and illegal drug use cigarette smoking,
endocrine changes, nutrition differences, and activity
levels have for study results, as well as the extent to
which the duration and severity of the subjects’ mental
illnesses may have contributed to the magnitude of any
structural changes or functional differences identified
during the study.80 Finally, insurers also have a range
of substantive and normative defenses; that is, that
76 See, e.g., Dawn Capp & Joan G. Esnayra, It’s All in Your
Head—Defining Psychiatric Disabilities as Physical Disabil-
ities, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. EV. 97, 106–114 (2000) (examining the
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and genetic correlates of the
signs and symptoms of many mental disorders).
77 See Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *25 (“Unum contends
that [the plaintiff] does not have bipolar disorder because there
are no brain studies showing changes in her brain. Yet Unum
concedes that bipolar disorder ‘cannot be diagnosed with a
brain scan.’”) (internal references omitted).
78 See, e.g., Mark Pettit, FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain
Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. L. &
MED. 319 (2007); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie
Detection: The Cultural Bias against “Mind Reading” Devices,
72 BROOKLYN L. EV. 1351 (2007); Erin A. Egan, Neuroimaging
as Evidence, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 62 (2007);
Jocelyn Downie & Ronalda Murphy, Inadmissible, Eh? 7(9)
AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 67 (2007); Charles N. W.
Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
509 (2006); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading for the
Gatekeeper? 7 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2006).
79 See, e.g., Grace E. Jackson, A Curious Consensus: “Brain
Scans Prove Disease?,” L. PROJECT PSYCHIATRIC TS., available
at http://psychrights.org/Articles/GEJacksonMDBrainScan
CuriousConsensus.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2008; discussing
limitations on the use of functional neuroimaging for psychi-
atric diagnosis).
80 See, e.g., Robert B. Zipursky, Imaging Mental Disorders in
the 21st Century, 52 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 133, 133 (2007).
71 J.M. De La Fuente et al., Brain Glucose Metabolism in
Borderline Personality Disorder, 31 J. PSYCHIATRIC ES. 531–41
(1997).
72 CARLSON, supra note 70, at 234.
73 Id. at 437.
70 NEIL R. CARLSON, PHYSIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR 335 (6th ed.
1998).
74 Id.
75 Brian Doherty, ‘You Can’t See Why on fMRI’: What Science
Can and Cannot Tell Us about the Insanity Defense, EASON
ONLINE, July 2007, available at http://www.reason.com/news/
show/120266.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) (noting the
frequency with which expert witnesses testify in legal proceed-
ings and reclassify complicated moral and legal questions as
seemingly clear-cut, brain-based, scientific matters.).
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statutory cost containment,81 lack of medical necessi-
ty,82 and other reasons justify a coverage refusal
regardless of the merit of the neuroscience-based
claim.
Finally, I anticipate that increased public under-
standing of the behavioral and brain sciences may
impact the application of the layperson standard in
jurisdictions that follow it. Remember the Eighth
Circuit case in which the court stated that the test of
whether a condition is physical or mental depends on
how a reasonable layperson would understand or
perceive the condition?83 That case was decided in
1990, at the beginning of the United States’ Decade
of the Brain,84 when the average American may not
have known too much about the causes or effects of
mental disorders. In the eighteen years since then, the
American public has been inundated with information
regarding the treatable organic basis of many mental
disorders. On March 16, 1993, the New York Times
made public the findings of a confidential government
report exploring health reform for individuals with
mental disorders.85 The report, authored by the
National Advisory Mental Health Council, stated that,
“contrary to persistent myth, mental illnesses are both
real and definable”86 and that “the efficacy of an
extensive array of treatments for specific mental
disorders has been systematically tested in controlled
clinical trials [and] demonstrate[s] that mental disor-
ders can now be diagnosed and treated as precisely
and effectively as are other disorders in medicine.”87
Stephen Hyman, former Director of the NIMH,
referenced several neuroimaging studies when he told
Congress in 1996 that mental disorders are diseases of
the brain:
[T]he accumulating weight of the evidence and
the great bulk of it resulting from NIMH-
sponsored research demonstrates that mental
disorders are brain diseases…. We know that
individuals with schizophrenia have abnormalities
in the size of their cerebral ventricles, those fluid-
filled cavities in the brain; simply put, in schizo-
phrenia, we see irregularities in the ratio of brain
tissue to fluid in the brain. NIMH-sponsored
research also has provided compelling evidence
that the connections of nerve cells in the brain, the
circuits that underlie the processing of thoughts
and emotions, do not develop or function normally
in patients with schizophrenia… [Current] scien-
tific techniques demonstrate beyond doubt that
schizophrenia is a primary brain disorder.”88
83 Brewer, 921 F.2d at 153–154 (“[L]aypersons are inclined to
focus on the symptoms of an illness; illnesses whose primary
symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior
are commonly characterized as mental illnesses regardless of
their cause…”).
84 U.S. Library of Congress, Project on Decade of the Brain,
available at http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/ (last visited Jan. 30,
2008).
85 Robert Pear, White House Plan Would Cover Cost of Mental
Illness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1993, at A1 (citing National
Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care Reform for
Americans with Severe Mental Illnesses, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1447 (1993)).
86 Id. at A1.
87 National Advisory Mental Health Council, Health Care
Reform for Americans with Severe Mental Illnesses: Report of
the National Advisory Mental Health Council, 150 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1447, at Abstract (1993).
82 See, e.g., William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical
Necessity, 22(7) PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 362 (1992) (discussing
insurers’ application of the medical necessity requirement in the
context of reimbursement for treatment of psychiatric con-
ditions; identifying key factors that underlie the concept of
medical necessity in psychiatric practice); Nancy W. Miller,
What Is Medical Necessity?, PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIGEST (Aug.
2002) (“[There are] as many definitions of medical necessity as
there are payors, laws, and courts to interpret them. Generally
speaking, though, most definitions incorporate the principle of
providing services which are ‘reasonable and necessary’ or
‘appropriate’ in light of clinical standards of practice….
Medicare defines ‘medical necessity’ as services or items
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of
illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed
body member. While that sounds like a hard and fast rule,
consider that CMS (formerly HCFA) has the power under the
Social Security Act to determine if the method of treating a
patient in the particular case is reasonable and necessary on a
case-by-case basis.”); Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 5
(examining medical necessity in the context of mental health
care).
81 See, e.g., Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, codified at 29
U.S.C. § 1185a(C)(2) (allowing insurers to opt out of parity if
parity raises overall plan costs by more than one percent);
Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a
(e)(1) and (2) (Sept. 19, 2007) (exempting from parity group
health plans “whose compliance would increase total costs by
more than 2% during the first year or by more than 1% each
subsequent year”).
88 Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human
Serv., Educ. & Related Agencies of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 104th Cong. 363, 375 (1996) (statement of
Stephen Hyman, Director, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, Depart-
ment of Health & Human Servs).
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In 1999, Surgeon General David Satcher released
an influential report in which he referenced research
in basic neuroscience, behavioral science, and behav-
ioral genetics to support the characterization of mental
disorders as “real health conditions” for which “a
range of treatments exist.”89 And, since 1999, the
public has been overwhelmed with television, print,
radio, and electronic news regarding advances in
neuroimaging, neurointerventions, and the behavioral
and brain sciences.90 “An endless stream of news
stories about the latest advances in brain scans and the
chemical conquest of personality enhances the
experts’ credibility and feeds into a belief that we
have come to a sophisticated understanding of the
intersection between mind, brain, and behavior.”91 As
the public continues to receive this information, I
suspect the application of the reasonable layperson
test in health insurance coverage disputes may begin
to swing in favor of plaintiffs who claim that their
mental disorders are physical in nature.92
The Mental Health Parity Debate
In the early 1990s, many stakeholders began to lobby
Congress and State legislatures for health insurance
parity, reasoning that there is no biological justifica-
tion for the unequal insurance coverage of mental and
physical conditions by health insurance plans.93
Insurers responded with a multi-layered cost-contain-
ment defense. By limiting mental health coverage,
insurers claimed they could reduce costs, maintain
premium levels, and cover more individuals.94 Insur-
ers also claimed that increased mental health benefits
would give rise to adverse selection (that is, that
consumers with mental health conditions that required
expensive treatments would select those plans that
provided coverage for such treatments).95 Insurers
also expressed concern that consumers’ demand for
mental health treatment would be highly responsive to
the presence of insurance coverage96 and that con-
sumers would seek treatment and reimbursement for
“frivolous” emotional conditions and other mental
disorders characterized by diagnostic ambiguity and
uncertain treatment success.97 The Commerce and
Industry Association of New Jersey opposed legisla-
tive efforts to expand mental health benefits in the
State of New Jersey for fear that the legislation
“would uncover unworthy disorders such as shyness,
boastfulness, fetishism, and impulsiveness.”98 The
New Jersey Business and Industry Association simi-
larly worried that the legislation would require
insurers to cover less serious mental disorders listed
in the DSM-IV, including “sibling relational problems
and caffeine addiction.”99 Stakeholders in favor of
91 Doherty, supra note 75.
92 Shannon, supra note 20, at 75.
93 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 99 (“Nowhere is the gap
between science and society more pronounced than in health
benefit coverage for mental illness.”); LaFratta, supra note 17,
at 406 (same); Kaplan, supra note 26, at 328 (same).
94 See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 35, at 186 (“Resistance to such
legislation centers on concerns over cost, diagnostic and
prognostic indeterminacy, and ambiguity at the line dividing
medical from non-medical treatments important to the seriously
mentally ill.”); Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All
Illnesses Equally?—Mental vs. Physical Illness: Congressional
and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclu-
sions from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided
Health Benefits under the Mental Health Parity Act and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L. J. 767, 773
(1997/1998) (same).
95 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 94, at 774–77 (1997/1998)
(applying theories of moral hazard to mental health insurance
coverage); LaFratta, supra note 17, at 405 (same).
98 See Kaplan, supra note 26, at 338, n. 97.
96 See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Subsidizing
Addiction: Do State Health Insurance Mandates Increase
Alcohol Consumption?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 175, 176 (2006).
97 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 94, at 774–77; LaFratta, supra
note 17, at 405.
90 See, e.g., Jason Pontin, Mind Over Matter, with a Machine’s
Help, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at F3; Sandra Blakeslee, A
Small Part of the Brain and Its Profound Effects, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2007, at F6; Sandra Blakeslee, Just What’s Going on
Inside that Head of Yours? N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2000, at F6;
Holcomb B. Noble, Pain at Work: Startling Images and New
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at F1.
89 U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH:
A EPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, Executive Summary vii
(1999), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
mentalhealth/summary.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2008) (“The U.S.
Congress declared the 1990s the Decade of the Brain. In this
decade we have learned much through research—in basic
neuroscience, behavioral science, and genetics—about the com-
plex workings of the brain. Research can help us gain a further
understanding of the fundamental mechanisms underlying
thought, emotion, and behavior—and an understanding of what
goes wrong in the brain in mental illness. It can also lead to better
treatments and improved services for our diverse population….”).
99 See id. at 338, n. 98.
The impact of neuroscience on health law 111
mental health parity responded by offering evidence
that the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders is
precise, effective, and successful.100
By the mid-1990s, proponents of mental health
parity had achieved some success at the federal and
State level.101 At the federal level, Congress passed
the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996 (the 1996
MHPA), which required group health plans offering a
mental health benefit in conjunction with medical and
surgical benefits to provide equality for any annual or
lifetime aggregate spending caps imposed within the
plan.102 A regulated group health plan that offered a
lifetime cap of $1 million for treatment for physical
illnesses, for example, would be required to establish
a $1 million cap for treatment of mental disorders.
The 1996 MHPA did not require covered health plans
to actually offer a mental health benefit,103 nor did it
prohibit covered plans from imposing higher copay-
ments or deductibles for mental health services,
different limits on numbers of visits or days of
coverage, or otherwise establishing different cost-
sharing ratios.104 Thus, a regulated group health plan
could reimburse a patient 100% of the cost of a visit
to an orthopedic surgeon, but only 50% of the cost of
a visit to a psychiatrist.105
Mental health parity continues to be an issue at the
federal level. As of early 2008, there are competing
versions of a new mental health parity bill in the
House of Representatives and the Senate.106 Some
mental health advocates believe that the new legisla-
tion, if passed, will represent a substantial improve-
ment over the 1996 MHPA. One Senate version, for
example, extended the federal parity mandate to
deductibles, coinsurance, and the number of visits
each year.107 This Senate version did not require
regulated group health plans to offer a mental health
benefit108 and it also contained an exemption for
group health plans whose compliance would increase
total costs by more than two percent during the first
year or by more than one percent each subsequent
year.109
Many State legislatures have enacted their own
mental health parity laws, which vary widely in
scope.110 Some of these laws require insurers to offer
mental health benefits and to provide full parity
between physical and mental health benefits, some
laws require insurers to offer optional mental health
coverage, some laws require insurers to offer mental
health benefits equal to medical health benefits but
only if mental health benefits are offered, some laws
require a minimum level of coverage for mental health
benefits, and some laws contain yet other variations.111
One question is whether advances in neuroscience
will impact mental health parity interpretations or
applications at the federal or State level. I think they
may in at least two different ways. The first way
relates to the way in which litigants or courts interpret
103 29 U.S.C. § 1185a(b)(1) (1996).
104 Id. § 1185a(b)(2).
105 See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health
Parity Act”: Achieving Equal Treatment for the Mentally Ill,
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.
pl?page=/colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
106 Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007,
H.R. 1424, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 9, 2007; Mental Health
Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 19, 2007 (“A
bill to provide parity between health insurance coverage of
mental health benefits for medical and surgical services”).
107 See, e.g., The Senate Approves the “2007 Mental Health
Parity Act”: Achieving Equal Treatment for the Mentally Ill,
available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/scripts/printer_friendly.
pl?page = /colb/20071001.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008) (“[T]
he new law would signal progress in the acceptance of mental
illness as a ‘real’ medical condition, one that deserves the same
accommodation and concern as heart disease or cancer. Such
acceptance could diminish the stigma attached to people who
suffer from these conditions and could, accordingly, motivate
people who might otherwise feel ashamed to seek care when
they need it.”).
108 Mental Health Parity Act, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a(a),
Sept. 19, 2007 (only requiring parity for a group health plan
that “provides both medical and surgical benefits and mental
health benefits”).
109 Id. § 712a(e)(1) and (2).
100 See, e.g., Gold, supra note 94, at 777.
101 See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 17, at 93. See also Mental
Health America, Mental Health Parity Timelines, available at
http://www1.nmha.org/state/parity/parityTimeline.cfm (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2008).
102 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–204,
702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (Sept. 26, 1996), codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1185a(a)(1) and (2) (1996).
110 See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 35, at 190 (summarizing state
mental health parity laws); Michele Garvin et al., Mental
Health Parity: The Massachusetts Experience in Context, 47 B.
B.J. 18 (May/June 2003), at *19 (same); NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LAWS MANDATING OR
EGULATING MENTAL HEALTH BENEFITS (Nov. 1, 2007), available
at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/mentalben.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 4, 2008) (same).
111 Garvin et al., supra note 110, at *19.
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the mental health benefits that are subject to the
applicable parity mandate. Many State laws contain
specific descriptions of the mental health benefits that
are subject to the State’s parity mandate.112 Connect-
icut, for example, mandates insurance coverage for
most conditions listed in the DSM-IV.113 Montana
mandates parity for seven disorders: schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major de-
pression, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disor-
der, and autism.114 New Jersey mandates insurance
coverage for “a mental or nervous condition that is
caused by a biological disorder of the brain and
results in a clinically significant or psychological
syndrome or pattern that substantially limits the
functioning of the person with the illness, including,
but not limited to, schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder,
paranoia and other psychotic disorders, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, panic disorder and pervasive
developmental disorder or autism.”115 Nebraska ex-
pressly ties its current definition of serious mental
illness to the state of medical science: “any mental
health condition that current medical science affirms
is caused by a biological disorder of the brain and that
substantially limits the life activities of the person
with the serious mental illness….”116 Many scholars
also urge the adoption of mental disorder definitions
that are tied to the current state of medical science:
“Congress should pass legislation requiring full parity
between certain biologically based mental illnesses and
physical illnesses. Such a bill should include a very
small list of disorders with the clearest scientific
backing for their biological bases…. [I]t would be
relatively simple matter to amend the law in the future
to add any other diagnoses that achieve wide scientific
recognition as a biologically based brain disorder.”117
Given litigants’ liberal use of expert psychiatric,
psychological, and neuroimaging evidence to support
brain-based claims starting in the late 1980s, I suspect
that in States such as New Jersey that mandate
insurance coverage for “a mental or nervous condition
that is caused by a biological disorder of the brain” or
in States such as Nebraska that expressly define
protected mental health benefits in terms of whether
“current medical science affirms [that the disorder] is
caused by a biological disorder of the brain,”118
aggressive plaintiffs may use structural and functional
neuroimaging studies in an attempt to establish a
biological basis for their conditions, the treatment of
which would then be subject to the State’s parity
mandate. Note that any neuroscience-based evidence
would not necessarily be sufficient for the plaintiff; in
some states, she still would be required to prove that
her mental disorder substantially limits her function-
ing, which may require additional medical or social
evidence regarding her inability to work or complete
other activities of daily living.119 Again, insurers
would have an evidentiary defense120 as well as a
range of substantive and normative defenses; that is,
that cost containment,121 lack of medical necessity,122
or other reasons justify insurers’ refusal to cover the
115 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-19 (2007).
116 NEB. EV. STAT. § 44–792(5)(a) (2008).
117 Nelson, supra note 17, at 108.
118 NEB. EV. STAT. § 44–792(5)(a) (2008).
119 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:27A-19 (2007) (mandating
insurance coverage for “a mental or nervous condition… that
substantially limits the functioning of the person with the
illness…”).
120 See, e.g., Mark Pettit, FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain
Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. L. &
MED. 319 (2007); Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie
Detection: The Cultural Bias against “Mind Reading” Devices,
72 BROOKLYN L. EV. 1351 (2007); Erin A. Egan, Neuroimaging
as Evidence, 7(9) AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 62 (2007);
Jocelyn Downie & Ronalda Murphy, Inadmissible, Eh? 7(9)
AM. J. BIOETHICS-NEUROSCIENCE 67 (2007); Charles N. W.
Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J.
509 (2006); Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading for the
Gatekeeper? 7 HOUSTON J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2006).
121 See, e.g., the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, codified at
29 U.S.C. § 1185a(C)(2) (allowing insurers to opt out of parity
if parity raises overall plan costs more than one percent);
Mental Health Parity Act of 2007, S. 558, 110th Cong., § 712a
(e)(1) and (2), Sept. 19, 2007 (exempting from parity group
health plans “whose compliance would increase total costs by
more than 2% during the first year or by more than 1% each
subsequent year”).
122 See, e.g., Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing
medical necessity in the context of mental health care).
112 See, e.g., Brunalli, supra note 34, at 601 (describing
different states’ definitions of mental illness); Michael J.
Carroll, The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996: Let It Sunset
if Real Changes Are Not Made, 52 DRAKE L. EV. 553, 570–71
(2004) (same).
113 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-514(a) (2008) (excluding caffeine
use disorders and other less serious mental disorders).
114 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33–22–706(6)(a)-(g) (2007).
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extra mental disorders regardless of the merit of
plaintiffs’ neuroscience-based claims.
A second way in which advances in neuroimaging
may impact mental health parity law is to provide
support for the passage of parity legislation in states that
do not have such legislation or support for more
stringent parity legislation at the federal or State level.
When the Texas Legislature was considering a mental
health parity bill in 1991, Senator Mike Moncrief (D-
Fort Worth), the bill’s sponsor, wanted the Texas
Legislature to understand why he was concerned about
insurers’ willingness to cover treatments for neurolog-
ical disorders such as Parkinson’s disease but not mental
disorders such as schizophrenia.123 Senator Moncrief
told the Legislature that the disparate treatment was
illogical because both conditions involve an imbalance
of the same chemical: “‘[The] chemical factor in the
brain involved in both of these diseases is the same;
it’s dopamine. One disease involves an overabundance
of dopamine while the other is a shortage of the
identical neurotransmitter.’”124 I anticipate that propo-
nents of mental health parity legislation will continue
to use neuroscience to illustrate what they perceive to
be illogical or unjust coverage discrepancies.125 In a
2004 essay published in the Harvard Journal on
Legislation, Representative Patrick Kennedy (D-R.I.)
argued that, “In the face of a growing body of scientific
literature documenting the biochemical nature of mental
illnesses, the status quo of insurance discrimination
against those who suffer from such illnesses is
indefensible.”126 Kennedy cited three NIMH research
summaries noting that NIMH investigators had discov-
ered “specific, subtle abnormalities in the structure and
function of the brains of patients with schizophrenia,”
that “one of the most consistent findings to date has
been the appearance of specific abnormalities, or
lesions, in the white matter of the brain in patients with
bipolar disorder,” and that “animal research suggests
that “different anxiety disorders may be associated with
activation in different parts of the amygdala.”127
Kennedy concluded: “In an era where researchers are
churning out even more science exploring the biochem-
ical and physiological causes and effects of mental
illnesses, there is no excuse for such differential
treatment.”128 Kennedy is the lead sponsor of the
House version of the mental health parity bill currently
before Congress.129
The Distribution of Social Security
and Other Benefits
Stakeholders also are using advances in neuroscience,
especially neuroimaging, to impact disputes about the
receipt of benefits under public and private disability,
social security, and other benefit programs. To prevent
healthy plaintiffs from receiving benefits when they
do not have a disability, disability plans and programs
tend to define disability in terms of an abnormality
that is “demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical
and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”130 Medical
evidence is the cornerstone of disability status.131
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), for
example, is only available to claimants who can
furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of
a disability, including “medical signs and findings,
established by medially acceptable clinical or labora-
124 Id.
125 Beth Mellen Harrison, Mental Health Parity, 39 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 255, 265 (2002) (“Given these advances in research,
there is no scientific justification for treating mental health
services differently than general medical services.”).
126 Representative Patrick J. Kennedy, Why We Must End
Insurance Discrimination Against Mental Health Care, 41
HARV. J. LEGIS. 363, 367 (2004).
127 Id. at 367, n.39.
128 Id. at 374–75.
130 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 423(d)(3) (2007)
(defining disability for purposes of Social Security Disability
Insurance as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months... For purposes of this
subsection, a ‘physical or mental impairment’ is an impairment
that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.”).
131 See, e.g., Social Security Administration, Disability Evalu-
ation under Social Security, BLUE BOOK, at Part II, Evidentiary
Requirements (June 2006; amended April 2007), avail-
able at http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/
evidentiary.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008) (“Under both the
Title II and Title XVI programs, medical evidence is the
cornerstone for the determination of disability.”).
129 Paul Wellstone Addiction and Mental Equity Act of 2007,
H.R. 1424, 110th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 9, 2007.
123 Shannon, supra note 20, at 397, n.145 (citing Tex. Floor
Debate, 71st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Apr. 25, 1991) (transcript
available from Senate Journal Office; Statement of Sen.
Moncrief)).
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tory diagnostic techniques.”132 Because the Social
Security Administration (SSA) will not consider claim-
ants’ subjective pain or other claims as conclusive
evidence of disability133 but will consider more objective
evidence134 such as “abnormal magnetic resonance
imaging brain scan[s],”135 I anticipate that more
plaintiffs will attempt to offer neuroimaging evidence
of their disabilities, especially in light of the frequency
with which claimants already have introduced brain
scans in an attempt to prove their disabilities and with
which courts already have denied disability claims based
on the lack of neuroimaging or other “objective”
evidence of a disability.
In 2003, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed a district court’s decision to affirm
the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of the
plaintiff’s claim for SSDI benefits based a number of
physical complaints, including fibromyalgia, pain,
and chronic fatigue syndrome.136 The Sixth Circuit
quoted the SSA’s statutory standard for assessing pain
and fatigue, which requires “objective clinical or
laboratory manifestations” versus subjective first-
person complaints.137 Given that no traditional labo-
ratory tests confirm diagnoses such as chronic fatigue
syndrome, the SSA stated below that it would allow
findings from an “abnormal magnetic resonance
imaging MRI brain scan.”138 The Sixth Circuit
ultimately affirmed the district court’s conclusion that
the claimant did not provide sufficient evidence of her
disability status because she did not submit sufficient
objective evidence of her pain.139
Neuroscience also is being used to impact disputes
about the receipt of benefits under private disability
plans. In 2005, for example, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals reviewed a district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the NFL Players
Retirement Plan and the NFL Players Supplemental
Disability Plan (Plans) in a lawsuit filed by former
professional football player Brent Boyd for disability
benefits.140 Boyd claimed that he suffered organic
brain problems after he was knocked unconscious in a
preseason football game in August 1980 and that his
“constant flu-like feeling, fatigue, headaches, queasi-
ness, forgetfulness, intermittent blurred vision, diffi-
culty reading, lack of concentration, learning
difficulty, memory loss, and dizziness and light-
headedness” qualified him for total and permanent
disability benefits under the Plans.141 As part of the
lawsuit, Boyd was subjected to nearly two days of
neuropsychological testing. Some of the physicians
agreed with Boyd that his single photon emission
computed tomography (SPECT) scan showed “de-
creased brain activity ‘consistent with head trau-
ma’”142 and that he was disabled due to his August
1980 brain injury.143 Other physicians agreed with the
Plans that Boyd’s depression, untreated hypertension
and physical deconditioning, and not the alleged
August 1980 head injury, caused his symptoms.144
In the end, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Plans.145
135 Bartyzel v. Commissioner, 74 Fed. Appx. 515, 527 (6th Cir.
2003) (“[T]he following findings will be sufficient, although
not required, to establish a medically determinable impairment
under the Act:... An abnormal magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) brain scan…”).
136 Id. at 515.
137 Id. at 524 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2008) (“‘there
must be medical signs and findings, established by medically
acceptable or clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques,
which show the existence of a medical impairment that results
from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities
which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain.’”));
id. at 527 (“[E]vidence of an impairment must include objective
clinical or laboratory manifestations.”).
138 Id. at 527.
139 Id. at 528–529.
140 Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement
Plan, 410 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2005).
141 Id. at 1175.
142 Id. at 1177.
143 Id.
144 Id.
134 Id. § (“[T]here must be medical signs and findings,
established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory
diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical
impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities which could reasonably be
expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and
which, when considered with all evidence required to be
furnished under this paragraph (including statements of the
individual or his physician as to the intensity and persistence of
such pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the medical signs and findings),
would lead to a conclusion that the individual is under a
disability.”).
132 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007).
133 Id. § 423(d)(5)(A) (2007) (“An individual’s statement as to
pain or other symptoms shall not alone be conclusive evidence
of disability as defined in this section….”).
145 Id. at 1179.
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Based on the Boyd case and a number of other
disability cases in which structural and functional
brain scans have been ordered, used, or requested,146 I
anticipate that plaintiffs will continue to attempt to
introduce both structural and functional neuroimaging
evidence in support of their disability claims.147 How
might we assess these claims? Many of the limitations
mentioned in the previous sections will apply, but
note that the SSA and many private disability plans
require disability claimants to be unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months.148 Courts have
found many claimants with traditional mental disor-
ders not protected because they were able to engage
in some type of gainful work activity. The burden of
establishing disability is on the claimant, and sub-
stantial evidence of disability usually is required.149
Plaintiffs thus may offer neuroimaging evidence of
their impairments, but neuroscience likely will not
provide evidence of the existence or significance of
any work or other social limitation.150
Conclusion
American patients, patient advocacy organizations, lit-
igants, lobbyists, legislators, and scholars are relying on
advances in the behavioral and brain sciences to
characterize structural and functional differences as
brain-based health conditions worthy of insurance cover-
age, statutory parity, and disability benefits. Some of
these claims concern me. Consider the insurer who
argued that the plaintiff did not have a mental disorder
because the plaintiff had not presented any neuroimaging
evidence of the disorder but then conceded that neuro-
imaging cannot yet diagnose mental disorders.151 This
type of argumentation shows the extent to which
litigants may be willing to throw into the ring any
neuroscience-based claim in the hope that something
will stick with the judge or the jury. Although
concessions and alternative argumentation are part and
parcel of zealous advocacy, they do not help judges,
jurors, or litigants obtain a more sophisticated under-
standing of neuroscience in general or the capability of
neuroimaging technologies in particular. One of the
reasons I am excited about the emerging neurolaw and
neuroethics literature is that judges may read the careful
scientific, philosophical, and evidentiary analyses and
issue better opinions as a result.
147 The health, disability, and welfare case law is filled with
claims by plaintiffs for benefits based on a range of novel
conditions and behaviors, such as phobia of driving in
unfamiliar locations, known propensity to engage in risky
behavior, ability to become angered easily, sensitivity to
fragrances, cat and dog allergies, other allergies and chemical
sensitivities, fear of cancer, grief, conversion disorder, albinism,
eosinophilia, generalized stress, and so on. See, e.g., Sinkler v.
Midwest Property Management, 209 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2000)
(phobia of driving anywhere unfamiliar did not substantially
limit plaintiff’s ability to work and therefore is not a disability);
Christian v. St. Anthony Medical Center, 117 F.3d 1051 (7th
Cir. 1997) (plaintiff claimed disability of high cholesterol
level); Fenton v. Pritchard Corp. 926 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan.
1996) (plaintiff’s propensity to “go postal” or “go ballistic” not
a disability); Kaufmann v. GMAC Mortgage, 2007 WL
1933913 (3rd Cir. 2007) (plaintiff claimed disability of
fragrance sensitivity); Gallagher v. Sunrise Assisted Living of
Haverford, 268 F. Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (allergy to cats
and dogs not a disability); Shah v. Upjohn Co., 922 F. Supp. 15
(W.D. Mich. 1995) (allergy to job and fear of cancer do not
constitute disabilities); Bukta v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 359 F.
Supp.2d 649 (2004) (plaintiff claimed conversation disorder
was disability); Baker v. Greyhound Bus Line, 240 F. Supp.2d
454 (D. Md. 2003) (albinism not disability); 42 U.S.C.A. §
12102, Notes of Decisions, 44–149 (2005) (annotated list of
hundreds of cases in which plaintiffs claim tradition and novel
disabilities).
148 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2) (2007) (“An individual
shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical
or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with
respect to any individual), ‘work which exists in the national
economy’ means work which exists in significant numbers
either in the region where such individual lives or in several
regions of the country.”).
146 See, e.g., Kearney v. Standard Insurance Co., 175 F.3d
1084, 1092 (1999) (in which a physician recommended a brain
scan to clarify the disability insurance claimant’s diagnosis of
possible metabolic disturbance, early Alzheimer’s disease,
episode of ischemia, or embolus to the brain).
150 Id. at 940-41 (“The record contains substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s determination that Carter’s seizures were not
disabling. None of the physicians who treated or examined
Carter indicated that her seizures so severely restricted her
ability to engage in ‘substantial gainful activity’ as to be
disabling.”).
151 Fitts, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33397, *25.
149 Carter v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 937, 940 (2nd Cir. 1981)
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What gives me real cause for pause, though, is the
appropriateness of many of the stakeholders’ subse-
quent normative or substantive arguments; that is, that
all structural and functional brain differences should
be treated as covered or protected conditions for
purposes of health, disability, and benefit law. I do
think that neuroscience gives stakeholders one addi-
tional source of ammunition, perhaps some will refer
to it as evidence, in support of the normative
argument that mental disorders should be treated like
physical illnesses for purposes of health, disability,
and benefit law. I also think that advances in
neuroscience do give us reason to revisit age-old
health, disability, and benefit law questions, such as,
“What kinds of mental suffering create legitimate
claims from others through public or private health
insurance?”152 But neuroscience does not yet and
probably never will answer a range of questions that
are more important to the future of American health
law and policy. For example, neuroscience does not
yet tell us when a particular structural or functional
brain differences should be considered a neurological
characteristics or adaptation, on the one hand, or
evidence of a DSM-IV mental disorder that requires
treatment on the other. Neuroscience also does not tell
us how we should allocate finite health care dollars
among all of the different physical and mental disorders,
including the expanding category of biologically based
mental disorders. Even with advances in neuroscience,
we are still left to weigh the value of knowing that many
mental disorders may have a biological component
against the cost of providing equal insurance benefits,
the cost of expanding the scope of protected status under
disability law, and the cost of distributing additional
benefits under other legal schemes.
Neuroscience also does not give us a better
definition of “medical necessity,” which is the key
to reimbursement under most public and private
health insurance plans in the U.S. Neuroscience does
not tell us when a structural or functional difference
becomes significant enough such that its treatment
should be reimbursed by the Medicare or Medicaid
Programs or a private health insurance plan. Neuro-
science also does not tell us whether we should take a
“hard-line” or “expansive” view of medical necessi-
ty.153 Should our health insurers only reimburse
treatments for impairments that significantly interfere
with an individual’s ability to live and function? Or,
should our health insurers reimburse treatments that
would enhance healthy individuals’ current level of
functioning? Stated more broadly, should the U.S.
adopt a “normal function model” of health care (in
which the target of clinical action is a medically
defined deviation and the goal of health care is to
decrease the impact of disease or disability), a
“capability model” (in which the target of clinical
action is an unchosen constraint of personal capability
and the goal of health care is to enhance personal
capability) or a “welfare model” (in which the target
of clinical action is an unchosen constraint of
potential for happiness and the goal of health care is
to enhance potential for happiness)?154 Neuroscience,
as we all know, raises many new questions about the
differences between treatment and enhancement.155
Even with neuroscience, American health policy-
makers will continue to struggle with how best to
identify health care’s goals, define medically necessary
care, and determine howmuchmedically necessary care
public and private programs should provide.156 In the
meantime, I recommend that lawyers and scholars who
work in the areas of health, disability, and benefit law
(and not just those who self-identify as neurolawyers
or neuroethicists) be mindful of the ways in which
stakeholders will use neuroscience to bear on the
formulation and interpretation of such law.157
152 Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 5.
153 Id. See also William M. Glazer, Psychiatry and Medical
Necessity, 22(7) PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 362 (July 1992).
154 See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 10-11 (offering three
approaches to health care).
155 See, e.g., Robert Klitzman, Clinicians, Patients, and the
Brain, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY,
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 229, 236 (Judy Illes ed., 2006) (“What
if clinicians can improve upon a person’s baseline level of
cognitive functioning? Should clinicians be limited in doing so
in any way?”); Erik Parens, How Far Will the Term
Enhancement Get Us as We Grapple with New Ways to Shape
Our Selves? in NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD 152 (Steven
J. Marcus ed., 2002) (same).
156 See Sabin & Daniels, supra note 10, at 12.
157 See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERA-
PEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 7, 10 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J.
Winick eds., 1991) (encouraging stakeholders to consider ways
in which the clinical literature might bear on the formulation of
legal arrangements).
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